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I. INTRODUCTION

We all have learned to think like lawyers. In some ways it may have
seemed like learning a foreign or at least a new language. Really,
though, we used the same language we had already learned, the
grammar, punctuation, and mostly the same vocabulary. True, there were
new words and old words with added meanings. While the customs and
habits-not all helpful-of language usage survived, the adaptation to
talking law did involve some added customs and habits, including
stylistic variations.
There are some valuable insights to be gained from comparing law
talk' with lay discourse. Take tort talk, for instance. I doubt there is
anything sayable in that special jargon that cannot be translated into the
general language.2 There could be a shift in rhetorical impact from the
translation into plain talk, some times for the better, and often a gain in
our understanding of the topic or text will result.
There are risks to learning to think and talk like a lawyer One of

* Professor of Law, University of Florida. B.S., 1949, J.D., 1951, University of Oregon;
J.S.D., 1957, Yale University.
1. See LANGUAGE INTHE JUDICIAL PROCESS 10, 133 (Judith N. Levi & Anne Graffam
Walker eds., 1990) (commenting on the expression "law talk"). See generallyWALTER PROBERT,
LAW, LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION (1972). The expression can help in promoting words
consciousness.
2. Legal writing skills are essential for good lawyering, but equally important is skill in
translating from law talk into lay discourse for clients and other non-lawyers. There is a potential
dividend of enriched understanding of law attendant on immersion in the translating experiences.
3. See James R. Elkins, Thinking Like a Lawyer: Second Thoughts, 47 MERCER L. REV.
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them is becoming overly fond of rules and especially of concepts. While
a rule addiction may be incurable, an antidote for concept addiction, i.e.,4
conceptualism, is to infuse the victim with words consciousness.
Toward developing that antidote, and in the spirit of this symposium,
this essay explores several of the key concepts in tort talk, focusing on
intent, duty, and foreseeability. Leon Green once pursued related goals,
being a torts pundit and one of the legal realists who were especially
sensitive to words and verbal addictions.' There have been more recent
writings about Torts and language,6 and beyond Torts, linguistic theory
has had an increasing influence on legal scholarship.7 As has been true
of legal realism, the influence is bound to spread into legal education
and other practices.
By "conceptualism" I refer to the sort of response to certain words
in which a person treats them inappropriately, as if they were represen511, 515-19 (1996).
4. Words consciousness involves an attainable sensitivity to one's own and others' uses
of words. See generally JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 84-92 (6th prtg. 1949)
(discussing "word-consciousness"). Perhaps the most important authority discussing "word
consciousness" is LUDWIG WITGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 1953).
5. See, e.g., LEON GREEN, THE RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927) [hereinafter
GREEN, PROXIMATE CAUSE]; LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930) [hereinafter GREEN, JUDGE
AND JURY].

6. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORt, CAUSATION INTHE LAW (2d ed. 1985); J.M.
Balkin, The Rhetoric of Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REV. 197 (1990); James Boyle, The Anatomy
of a Torts Class, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 1003 (1985); Neal Feigenson, The Rhetoric of Torts: How
Advocates Help Jurors Think About Causation, Reasonableness, and Responsibility, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 61 (1995); David Howarth, "0 Madness of Discourse,That Cause Sets Up with
and Against Itself.," 96 YALE L.J. 1389 (1987) (reviewing H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORt,
CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed. 1985)); David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the
"Strict" Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743; Steven D. Smith, Rhetoric and
Rationality in the Law of Negligence, 69 MINN. L. REV. 277 (1984); Peter Meijes Tiersma, The
Language of Defamation, 66 TEX. L. REV. 303 (1987).
7. The diversity of theories and applications is immense, including literary criticism
theory applied to interpretation of legal texts; critical legal studies, including deconstruction and
spin-offs into "story telling"; hermeneutics; semiotics; language philosophy; and others. A
valuably extensive but still only partial reference work is JUDITH N. LEVI, LANGUAGE AND LAW:
A BIBLIOGRAPHIC GUIDE TO SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH IN THE U.S.A. (1994), which includes

mostly non-social science cites. For a sophisticated but relatively cryptic discussion of many of
the theories, see generally COSTAS DOUZINAS ET AL., POSTMODERN JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW
OF TEXTS IN THE TEXTS OF LAW (1991), also containing bibliographic references. For perhaps
the most imaginative and creative display of words consciousness, with little reference to grand
theory, see Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical
Phenomonology,36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986). See also LAW'S STORIES (Peter Brooks & Paul
Gewirth eds., 1996) (a collection of essays on storytelling and rhetoric); Laura E. Little,
Characterizationand Legal Discourse, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 372 (1996) (focusing on rhetorical
strategies but including references to other sorts of studies of law and language).
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tative of independent realities in the "mind" or somewhere! It can be
a kind of word magic.' One can conjure up illusory entities just by
giving them names, imagined concreteness from abstract terms. Word
magic may be appropriate for artistic, entertainment, or therapeutic
purposes, but around some further bend lies madness. Courts only
seldom go mad; even so, historically they would push invisible titles
around to follow equally nonexistent intents of sellers and buyers of
chattels.'0 Today, some Torts classes seem to have a related sort of
magic in the supposed automatic transfer of one person's tortious intent
toward a presumed target onto a completely unknown and perhaps
unforeseeable victim." Such fictions might not be a problem unless
they feed the addictions, and the way some students grab on to such
illusions suggests they do.
Let's face it. Law talkers are at especial risk of falling prey to word
magic, particularly those lawyers who have an overriding attachment to
law as rules. For example, some lawyers overconfidently believe that
reasoning in legal abstractions can satisfactorily foreclose grappling with
situational details and value judgments. Argument in terms of the
presence or absence of proximate cause often is illustrative. Summary
evaluations regarding reasonableness, foreseeability, and assumption of
the risk are similar.
Rule thinking naturally invites generalities, abstractions, and word
magic. "Rule" and "law" are themselves prime words of magic, words
which various scholars have tried to demystify.' 2 More subtly, one talks
8. Early attacks on legal conceptualism include VON JEHRING, IN THE HEAVEN OF LEGAL
CONCEPTS (18874), reprinted in READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 678
(Felix S. Cohen & Morris R. Cohen eds., 1951); Felix S. Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and
the Functional Approach, 35 COLuM. L. REV. 809 (1935). There is a history of some
philosophical support for belief in the independent reality, as it were, of concepts. See P.L.
Heath, Concept, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 177, 177-80 (1967). One of the most
effective attacks on such philosophical beliefs, a work highly influential in legal scholarship, is
WITrGENSTEIN, supra note 4.
9. A more elegant term is "reification (thingification)." See Peter Gabel, Reification in
Legal Reasoning, 3 RES. IN L. & SOC. 25, 25-28 (1980). For a more general anti-reification
work, see ALFRED KORZYBSKI, SCIENCE AND SANITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO NON-ARISTOTELIAN SYSTEMS AND GENERAL SEMANTICS (4th ed. 1958).
10. For an analysis of such cases, see Karl N. Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52
HARV. L. REV. 725 (1939); Karl N. Llewellyn, Through Title to Contractand a Bit Beyond, 15
N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 159 (1938).
11. For a curiously dogmatic essay on the topic, see William L. Prosser, Transferred
Intent, 45 TEX. L. REV. 650 (1967). He seems to have persuaded some Torts casebooks editors.
See, e.g., DAVID W. ROBERTSON sr AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 16 (1989). Cf. I
FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 276-77 (2d ed. 1986) (seeing transferred intent
as a sometimes justified fiction).
12. The most notable attempt came from the legal realists. See generally WILFRID E.
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law as rules without saying "law" or "rule." The perception that a
statement is a law or a rule can start the spell working. A Restatement
of Torts section is not a statute or a regulation. Yet, if it is perceived as
a rule, maybe with an "out there" kind of tangibility, then it can trigger
the kind of tunnelled thinking which typifies conceptualism and over
reliance on high level abstractions.
II. INTENT
Consider the following statement: "An actor is subject to liability for
battery if he acts with the intent to cause and does cause a harmful or
offensive bodily contact with another person." A word magician can
turn this statement into a rule depending on how the word "rule" is
employed, whether stressing the clear applications or instead all the
ambiguities and uncertainties, or splitting it into several "rules," or
whatever. Then maybe one can find a susceptible audience to work a
little magic with "battery," getting it to wonder what a battery "is," and
whether this or that set of "facts" (what a concept that is) "is" a battery.
The audience must be one whose linguistic habits 3 incline it to treat
"this is a battery" like "this is a book" so that it will more readily fall
into that feeling of tangibility and concreteness. Perhaps a more
perceptive audience will just shrug it off, knowing or suspecting that
"battery" is like other words, other categorizers, identifiers and indexers
in and out of law talk. There are different kinds of batteries, including
ones with no "bodily contact" as such, because "battery" necessarily has
different meanings and uses and will continue to spin off into even
more.

14

So it is with "intent," in law talk and out. We have the special added
kind of intent beyond the purpose kind. That is knowledge intent, the
actor's knowing a result is substantially certain to occur.15 Those are
the most important definitions of "intent," but the conceptualistic risk is

(1968); Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930). Then came their many successors,
starting with the "crits." See JAMES BOYLE, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1994); CriticalLegal
Studies Symposium, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
13. See generally IRVING J. LEE, LANGUAGE HABITS IN HUMAN AFFAIRS (1941), a
popularization of Korzybski's book, supra note 9.
14. The text of the most comprehensive treatise on Torts refers to "two kinds of batteries"
and the "elements of battery." HARPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 271. Yet a perusal of the
examples reveals not only the obvious ones of intentionally harmful and offensive bodily
contacts, but the kinds where intended bodily contact is not necessary, and "transferred intent"
cases. Id. at 274-77. See infra notes 16-23 and accompanying text for further variations bearing
on the intent variable and kinds of battery.
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
RUMBLE, JR., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM
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to equate intent solely to a state of mind and thus not to see other uses
of the word. Intent as state of mind takes on an entity like solidity. "He
had the intent... " has the same linguistic structure as "He had
something in his hand." There are other uses, not dictionary meanings,
of "intent." In lay understanding, one can intend an act or consequence
without thinking about it. One thinks great thoughts while walking, lost
in thought, yet how could one deny intending each step? Someone
seems to be looking at a person sitting down and he moves a chair
away. The person falls. An observer would see the whole thing as an
intentional act, a jury case for battery. This is not just circumstantial
evidence of a state of mind. We might say one is responsible to know
what he is "doing." One is presumed to know the normal consequences
of one's acts; i.e., to know what a normal person ordinarily would
know." Justice Cardozo said in the influential Ultramares case that
gross negligence in auditing accounts could be evidence of fraud.17
Closing one's eyes and "mind" to what was there to be seen is, even if
credible, tantamount to, not the same as, fraud, an intentional deception.
From inference to presumption to construction to fiction, "intent" is
being used to evaluate witnessed behavior."
The more apparent instances in which antisocial behavior is judged
by "intent" involve children and the mentally challenged.19 It may not
be possible, really, to know what was on such a person's "mind" or
even how well if at all "it" was functioning. Behavior which would
speak for itself of a normal adult can suffice for "battery" by one who
is not a normal adult. A classic example is Garrattv. Dailey.20 Most
law students over the last forty or so years will have confronted this
tragicomic case of the five year old lawn chair batterer. A middle aged

16. See, e.g., Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Phipps, 94 N.E. 793, 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 1911);
Millison v. E.I. du Pont deNemours & Co., 501 A.2d 505, 514 (N.J. 1985); Garratt v. Dailey
(I), 304 P.2d 681, 682 (Wash. 1956).
17. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 449 (N.Y. 1931); see also Rost v. UnitedStates, 803 F2d 448, 450-51 (9th Cir. 1986) ("willful negligence" as evidence of intent); Lopez
v. Surchia, 246 P.2d 111, 113 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952) (gross negligence can supply the
"intent" requirement for battery). For a discussion of "constructive intent," see David J. Jung &
David I. Levine, Whence Knowledge Intent? Whither Knowledge Intent?, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.

551, 556-57 (1987).
18. "[W]hen we describe people as exercising qualities of mind, we are not referring to
occult episodes of which their overt acts and utterances are effects; we are referring to those
overt acts and utterances themselves." GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 25 (1969). Cf
W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 8, at 34 (5th ed. 1984)
(stressing intent as a "state of mind").
19. KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, §§ 134-135, at 1072-75; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 283B (1965).
20. 279 P2d 1091 (Wash. 1955).
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arthritic woman fell and suffered a fractured hip when the boy cavorted
away with the chair to sit in it.2 He had been found innocent of
prankish or any purposeful intent but subject all the same to the battery
rule and full liability if he knew she would fall.22 That is a heap to
swallow early in the first term of law school, or any time, but there is
no sign in most casebooks of editorial intent to guide the students on to
see that all the tribute in the Garrattopinion to the Restatement of Torts
and the seeming search for a tortiously infected intent is mere camouflage.23 The reader is left to conceptualize intent which the court
instructed the trial judge to play with on remand.24 This word magic
allowed a finding of the impossible, that even though the woman was
not in the act of sitting down when the boy moved the chair, he
nonetheless knew she would fall.25 The trial judge acquiesced, complaining that no one could know what was on the boy's mind, but he
was willing, as he said, to construct the intent.26
III. DuTY
"Duty" and "intent" seem to not have much in common. There is no
mental reference from "duty." Of course, they are both terms in tort
talk, but moated off from each other. One could make some sort of
sense in saying Brian Dailey was held liable for violating his duty to
Ruth Garratt not to batter her. One also could speak in a similar vein of
any intentional tort, but it is just not the way lawyers habitually talk
torts. "Duty" is limited to negligence discourse, peculiar to it for
historical reasons.27
Still, "duty" and "intent" share a potential of conceptualistic
treatment. There is an entity-like reference from both, in the case of
"duty," saying one has a duty, like having a weight or tangible
21. Id. at 1092.

22. Id. at 1092-94.
23. See Walter Probert, A Case Study in Interpretationin Torts: Garratt v. Dailey, 19 U.

TOL. L. REv. 73, 75 (1987).
24. See Garratt v. Dailey, 279 E2d at 1095.
25. The gist of the court's move is to be spotted in its query to the trial judge whether the
boy knew the woman would attempt to sit down: If yes, then knowledge of "intent could be
inferred." Id. at 1094. Then, what is missed by many readers, the court states, "intent will be
established." Id. The court thus moves from "could be" to "will be," from a permissible
inference, albeit questionable, to a conclusive presumption.
26. Garratt v. Dailey (II), 304 P.2d at 682. For a discussion of the textual points and of
the record of the trial, first appeal, hearing on remand and second appeal, see generally Probert,
supra note 23.

27. For a good brief discussion of the history of the evolution of the duty concept in
negligence cases, see Fazzolari v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 734 P.2d 1326, 1327-32 (Or.
1987).
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attachment to someone else, or saying one owes a duty as some thing
to be handed over. There is also the willingness of user and interpreter
to let these terms explain too much by way of justification. Truly, to
justify Brian Dailey's liability by simply saying he intentionally battered
Ruth Garratt is most inadequate, if not absurd. Historically, it was surely
inadequate, at least looking back, to immunize suppliers of manufactured
products from liability for negligence to consumers by simply incanting
"no duty without privity.""8
"Duty" has a powerful rhetorical use in appealing to emotions,
deeply felt values, and culturally based norms. On the intuitive level, the
power of "duty" rhetoric is so strong that it is enough just to say that
parents owe duties to their children and citizens owe duties to their
country. The emotive, symbolic strength of "duty" (and "obligation") in
all sorts of social contexts has carried over to arguments and justifications in law. A driver of an automobile owes a duty to all around to
drive carefully, not just legally, but socially. Shall we say morally?
The moral push and pull of "duty" is surely felt in law talk, perhaps
most clearly in the "duty to aid persons in distress" question.29 A
century ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes pushed hard and influentially to
unload law talk generally of what he seemed to regard as the subjective
appeal of any of its moral connotations.3" "Duty" was the prime
example of a suspect term to be restrictively defined for legal purposes.
To say one owed a legal duty to another was simply to predict the
judicial response to the situation involved. Since a judge was not
predicting himself by declaring a duty of care, the declaration was to be
supported by an articulation of relevant policy considerations rather than
leaving it at the intuitive level. One may join in this anti-conceptualistic
attitude without so sharp a separation of moral discourse from legal
discourse. One should not close one's eyes to the ways we actually use
words when talking law, nor should one ignore the relevance of moral
considerations in thinking about tort related situations.
Leon Green continued Holmes's anti-conceptualistic push with his
functional definitions of not only "duty" but "proximate cause."'"

28. See generally Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842) (establishing the
requirement of privity of contract to sustain a negligence claim against suppliers and

contractors).
29. See Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809, 810 (N.H. 1898) (observing that a clear
moral duty does not give rise to a legal duty to aid). Other courts' views are that the presence
of a moral duty gives support to the finding of a legal duty. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976); Soldano v. O'Daniels, 141 Cal. App. 3d 443, 455
(Cal. CL App. 1983); Szabo v. Pennsylvania R.R., 40 A.2d 562, 563 (N.J. 1945).
30. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
31. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY, supra note 5; GREEN, PROXIMATE CAUSE, supra note 5;
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Green thought that both expressions are used by judges in their exercise
of power, not to determine but to announce their decisions on the status
of a claim, specifically whether to send it on for jury deliberation in an
allocation of decision making power. However, he believed "proximate
cause" was more subject to conceptualistic abuse than "duty," to the
point of favoring purging the former phrase from judicial use. William
Prosser was later to go even further to jump the "duty" ship by taking
the ultimate step to anti-conceptualize it by declaring it merely a
conclusory sort of a tie-a-string-around-the-judgment-package term.32
Two opinions of Justice Cardozo, the master rhetorician of his time,
test the Holmes-Green-Prosser stance on "duty." In perhaps the most
influential of all common law opinions, MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co.,33 Justice Cardozo tied manufacturers' tort duty to the power of the
law via the judges and to evolving social considerations and helped to
elevate foreseeability as the measure of responsibility. Rhetorically,
Justice Cardozo had no choice but to pay homage to duty even as he
decreased its power as a symbol for limiting responsibility in the
products area. Yet later, in perhaps the most academically provocative
Palsgrafcase,34 he took full advantage of the magical potentials of
"duty." Looking back at the debate between Justice Cardozo and
dissenting Justice Andrews, whether the defendant railroad owed a duty
to Mrs. Palsgraf to prevent her injury from the explosion of a seemingly
harmless package seems critical. 35Justice Andrews stressed that it was
"not a mere dispute as to words." But it was in part, so far as "duty"
was concerned, unless one takes Green's position that what "duty" and
the phrase Justice Andrews preferred, "proximate cause," really stood
for lay in their use to allocate decision making power between judge and
jury.36 Who should decide the liability issue was, after all, a prime
issue in the case.
Justice Andrews' rhetoric in effect reduced duty to surplusage, at
least in that case, giving it little more than nominal recognition as at
least part of the ritualistic formula of duty, breach and proximate cause
in negligence talk.37 Yet Justice Cardozo prevailed and took full advan-

Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014 (1928); Leon
Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: 11, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 255 (1929).
32. William L. Prosser, PalsgrafRevisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12-16 (1953); see also
KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, § 53, at 357 (reflecting Prosser's views).
33. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
34. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
dissenting).
35. Id. at 102 (Andrews, J.,
36. See supra text accompanying note 31.,
37. "Every one owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from those acts that may

unreasonably threaten the safety of others." Pasgraf,162 N.E. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
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tage of the symbolic, emotive power in the rhetoric of duty, here to limit
responsibility not only of the railroad but of others who could not
"reasonably foresee" any damage to a plaintiff even if they could to
others nearby. 8 If rhetorical strategy is not what it is all about-a big
"if"--then an analysis in terms of duty in Palsgraftells us little in itself
as to the reason for the decision. It provides us with a conduit to
foreseeability as the determinant. What the rhetoric of duty helps to
achieve in Justice Cardozo's opinion is to distract the reader's attention
from what is missing. The opinion ignores matters of accident prevention and economic risk management as well as questions of individual
justice which would be more readily triggered by closer attention to
situational details as opposed to an aloof circling about in the heaven of
legal concepts where DUTY resides."
So far as judicial words consciousness goes, the California Supreme
Court has wielded significant influence to demote the conceptualistic
power of "duty." It recognized the potential for arbitrariness in its use
to maintain vast populations immune from responsibility for socially and
professionally questionable conduct.' It furthered the view that
declaring the existence of duty was merely conclibsory and otherwise
question-begging unless the judicial task was seen as a balancing of
"policy considerations."4 Thus, the California Supreme Court opened
the potential for an ad hoc extension of the liability of lawyers,
accountants and other enterprisers beyond the scope of their contracts,
as well as that of land occupants42 and mental health care providers.43
Later, the Oregon Supreme Court seemed to rise to unusual judicial
heights of displayed words consciousness. First, it heeded Leon Green's
call and excised talk of proximate cause completely from the state
courts." Then it declared "duty" to be of limited value in the analysis

38. "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed." Palsgraf,162

N.E. at 100.
39. See generally VON JEHRING, supra note 8.
40. See, e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 686-88 (Cal. 1961) (finding duty of lawyer
to non-client); Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958) (upholding duty of notary to a
non-client).
41. Whether or not there was liability was said to be "a matter of policy" involving "the
balancing of various factors." Biakanja, 320 P.2d at 19.
42. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968) (holding that a plaintiff's status
as an invitee, licensee, or trespasser is not determinative in a negligence suit against an
occupier).
43. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 343 (holding that special relationships between psychotherapists
and patients "support affirmative duties for the benefit of third persons").

44. For the history of the Oregon court's rejection of "proximate cause," see Stewart v.
Jefferson Plywood Co., 469 P.2d 783, 784-85 (Or. 1970).
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of negligence claims. 45 Yet, it fell short in its approach to foreseeability
issues, as the following section suggests.

IV, FORBSEEABILrrY
Roll over, Leon Green. By your words-conscious critiques, you
influenced the Oregon Supreme Court to outlaw the use of "proximate
cause" and even to downplay duty analysis as largely surplusage. Even
so, the Court then gave priority to "foreseeability" as the determinant of
problematic questions as to the extent of liability in negligence claims,
despite your sharp attack on the use of that concept. 46 Your criticism47
came after England's highest court had, in the WagonMound case,"
engaged in anti-conceptualism of its own in scuttling the Polemis49
0
directness test, the sort of justification Andrews preferred in Palsgraft
and for other extent-of-liability questions. WagonMound involved a
negligent oil spill which resulted in a fire which destroyed a wharf.5
The fire had been determined to be factually unforeseeable and that, said
the court, not the directness of result, marked the limit of liability.52
Your critique of this justification rested on your general assessment of
the use of the "foreseeability" test in England and the United States; you
seemed amused (if not bemused) that your students seemed captivated
by the concept and would regard it as the universal solvent in the
negligence area, but disturbed that so many lawyers and judges would
be similarly captivated.53 In your view of it, foreseeability was a blatant
fiction, every bit as much as the reasonable man of your era.54
While there may be few in the mainstream even today who share
Green's skepticism that the foreseeability rationale has any truly
explanatory power, William Prosser was heavily critical of its use. 5
45. For the history of the Oregon court's restrictive use of the duty concept and substituted
reliance on "foreseeability," see Fazzolari v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 734 P.2d 1326, 1332-36
(Or. 1986).
46. See the discussion of the primacy of "foreseeability" in Stewart, 469 P.2d at 786-87.
"Foreseeability" is further discussed in Fazzolari,734 P.2d at 1333-34.
47. See generally Leon Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV.
1401 (1961). See also Leon Green, The Wagon Mound No. 2-ForeseeabilityRevisited, 1967
UTAH L. REV. 197.
48. Overseas Tankship Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co. (Wagon Mound 1), 1 All E.R.
404 (P.C. 1961) (appeal taken from New South Wales).
49. See In re Polemis, 3 K.B. 560, 570-71 (C.A. 1921).
50. Palsgraf,162 N.E. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
51. WagonMound 1, 1 All E.R. at 406-07.
52. Id. at 416.
53. See Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, supra note 47, at 1423.

54. Id. at 1421.
55. See Prosser, supra note 32, at 19. For a further critique of "foreseeability," see John
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His critique of relevant cases related to his assessment of the opinions
in the Palsgrafcase. While he seemed to believe that the defendant
railroad had slightly the better of it on the ultimate liability question, he
thought Justice Cardozo's foreseeability justification was no better than
Andrews' proximate cause analysis. 6 Yet Prosser threw up his hands
in trying to offer a better test, as if somehow there had to be some
simplistic approach." Green's premise was that such concepts as
foreseeability pretended to offer simple solutions in cases where there
was none. In Palsgraf,for instance, one could pay greater heed to the
environment of the explosion. When you consider the way the enterprise
was operated, allowing passengers to board moving trains, maintaining
a station so that the scales which purportedly struck Mrs. Palsgraf could
so readily be knocked over,5 9 and so on, it was just a "hell of a way to
run a railroad." Cardozo's abstractions, including the reference to
foreseeability of only a narrow part of what happened, arguably
fictionalized important matters out of the case, just as Prosser and others
have well analyzed.'
The use of "foreseeable" may not always be fictional, for instance,
in unproblematic cases outside of litigation or even those within where
the defendant's reasonableness, not the extent of liability, is the
question.61 However, where foreseeability of consequences or of
intervening causes is said to be determinative, it often can only be
constructed, at best. Take the occasion of the two chicken hawks who
burned down the plaintiff's building. They were sparring in flight when,
with talons locked, they closed the gap between defendant's uninsulated
high voltage power line and a guy wire on a utility pole. Electricity
travelled down the wire and into a barbed wire fence sagging against the

G. Fleming, The Passingof Polemis, 39 CAN. BAR REv. 507, 508-16 (1961).
56. See Prosser, supra note 32, at 19.
57. See id. at 28.
58. See generally Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, supra note 47; Green, The
Wagon Mound #2-ForeseeabilityRevisited, supra note 47.
59. See Palsgraf,162 N.E.2d at 99.
60. See Prosser, supra note 32, at 3, 7 (comparing the record of the case to Justice
Cardozo's opinion); see also JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 112-51
(1976) (hardhitting critique of Justice Cardozo's opinion); RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A
STUDY INREPUTATON 33-48 (1990) (calling attention to distortions in, and other criticisms of,
Justice Cardozo's opinion).
61. When the issue is whether a defendant acted unreasonably, the foreseeability question
is one of degree of likelihood, i.e., of the risk, of consequences factored into other variables. See
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 E2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Learned Hand's famous
formula involving the factors of burden on the activity, gravity of harm and degree of
probability); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 283, 291-293 (1961) (spelling out Hand's
formula in more detail, but as a balancing test).
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wire, causing a field fire which spread to plaintiff's building some
distance away. This was foreseeable, according to a court.62 Another
similar holding: Because of negligence, two vehicles collided, causing
one of them to become lodged in a stone stoop. Decedent was nearby
while the car was being extricated and a heavy stone was dislodged and
struck and killed her.63 Surely the detailed consequences in neither of
these cases was factually foreseeable.
The fancifulness also can go the other way. New York's highest
court once held that a negligently set fire would not foreseeably spread
to a neighboring property.' In Mississippi, it was held that a negligently caused explosion and fire in a service station would not foreseeably
cause a person fifty feet across the street in a restaurant to trip and fall
in fleeing to safety.65 She had heard the resulting clamor and calls of
imminent disaster." Maybe it was because the disaster did not occur,
but unforeseeability was the reason given for no liability.67
Further, there is the rhetorical manipulation. "Foreseeable" can be
played like an accordion, to stretch broadly or be restricted narrowly. To
be sure, foresight would be taxed unreasonably to require anticipation
of every detail of subsequent events. Further, one may be argued to be
accountable for the general kind of harm or consequence his negligence
risks. A case in point: A vehicle became trapped in mud on a dirt road
negligently maintained by a railroad company. An employee of a towing
enterprise attached a rope between the tow truck and the vehicle. His
peg leg became mired in a mud-filled hole in the road. He grabbed the
rear of the tow truck to help pull himself free, but his good leg was
grabbed by a coil in the rope, so mangling his leg as to require
amputation. This was held a foreseeable kind of result for a person who,
while lawfully using the road, had slipped into the hole and was injured
trying to extricate himself.68 Characterize events generally enough and
in the "right" way and anything is foreseeable, even Mrs. Palsgraf's
injuries.69

62. See Chase v. Washington Water Power Co., 11 P.2d 872, 873, 875 (Idaho 1941).
63. See In re Guardian Cas. Co., 2 N.Y.S.2d 232, 233-34 (N.Y. App. Div. 1938).
64. Se Ryan v. New York Cent. R.R., 35 N.Y. 210, 212 (N.Y. 1866).
65. Mauney v. Gulf Ref. Co., 9 So. 2d 780, 780 (Miss. 1942).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 782.
68. Hines v. Morrow, 236 S.W. 183, 185 (Tex. Ct. App. 1921). For a discussion of Hines
and the rhetorical point, see Clarence Morris, Proximate Cause in Minnesota, 34 MINN. L. REV.
185, 193-94 (1950).

69. Mrs. Palsgraf was arguably contractually a passenger, owed a duty of great care, as
noted in the intermediate appellate opinion. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 225 N.Y.S. 412, 414
(N.Y. App. Div. 1927). Physical injury to passengers was foreseeable from a number of different
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The rhetorical maneuvering works the other way when the precise
details of consequences are indeed emphasized to create a Rube
Goldberg cartoon effect. Illustrative is the case in which a crane
operator negligently brought the crane into contact with a high voltage
wire.70 Electricity passed through the crane and an unknown conduit
into the ground to bum a hole in a gas main.7 An explosion of the
escaping gas killed a man on the third floor of a nearby building.72
Who could foresee these bizarre details any more than those of the
unfortunate peg legged man's disaster which were held foreseeable?73
Another rhetorical strategy is to shift the vantage point for viewing
foreseeability as Andrews suggested in Palsgraf.Given the explosion,
Mrs. Palsgraf's injuries were foreseeable.74 The case of the driver who
negligently collided with a utility pole knocking out the traffic lights is
similar. Two other drivers then negligently collided as a result causing
injury to the plaintiff. The first driver might not be held to foresee that
his driving negligently would cause such consequences, but as the court
held, once he had collided with the pole and knocked out the
lights-voila-what happened was foreseeable.75 The Restatement of
Torts gives up the foreseeability quest in proximate (legal) cause cases
to look back from the
point of judgment to see if the events and result
76
seem extraordinary.
One can study all the cases analyzed by Green' and Prosser" and
the many similar ones since.79 Not only are the eyes likely to glaze but
risks related to letting passengers board moving trains in a crowded station.
70. Radigan v. W.J. Halloran Co., 196 A.2d 160, 161 (R.I. 1963).
71. Id.
72. Id.

73. For further discussion of the rhetorical playing of the generality of foreseeability
against the details of foreseeable consequences, see Fleming, supra note 55, at 520. For
discussion of the more general potentials of the pairing of contradictory legal characterizations,
see Little, supra note 7, at 378-79.
74. "I think... the foresight of which the courts speak, assumes prevision of the
explosion... ." Palsgraf,162 N.E. at 104-05 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
75. Farroggiaro v. Bowline, 315 P.2d 446, 449 (Cal. Dist. CL App. 1957).
76. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435 (1965).
77. See Green, Foreseeabilityin Negligence Law, supra note 47, at 1420-24; Green, The
Wagon Mound No.2-ForeseeabilityRevisited, supra note 47, at 197-206.
78. See Prosser, supra note 32, at 1-32.
79. See, e.g., Addis v. Steele, 648 N.E.2d 773, 776-77 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995) (need not
foresee arsonist, only some source of fire); Mancheton v. Auto Leasing Corp., 605 A.2d 208,
213-14 (N.H. 1992) (negligence of auto thief not foreseeable). Cf.Haught v. Maceluch, 681 F.2d
291 (5th Cir. 1982) (bystander mental distress and degrees of foreseeability a jury issue); Bigbee
v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 665 P.2d 947, 951-53 (Cal. 1983) (foreseeability of defective door
on phone booth located near dangerous traffic a jury issue); Vining v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys.,
Inc., 354 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1977) (foreseeability of thief's negligence a jury question); Bennett M.
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among the things one is likely to swear off is the word "foreseeable" as
truly but a chip in a game. Ah, but there's the thing. While the word is
a bit out of the ordinary, it does on the other hand share with words
generally. It is not just a law word, and further all words (including
"word") do not have but are given many meanings and are used in
various ways. What I suggest here for this word is a compromise
between a formalist's extreme of an impossible determinacy and an
overreacting skeptic's dismissal of any explanatory power in such a
word. Chip in many games it is, but as with language generally, it
becomes a matter of distinguishing the games people play with words,
using "game' and "play" non-pejoratively."
In the first place, when "foreseeable" is used in what seems to be a
kind of factual sense, as a prediction or anticipation, there is no implicit
degree of likelihood in the reference. It may run from possible through
likely and probable and even on up to certainty.8 The court that said
the spread of a negligently set fire to neighboring property was not
foreseeable arguably was using the word in the sense of likely or
probable. 2 When "foreseeable" is used in the context of determining
if a defendant acted unreasonably, not in the fashion of the reasonable
person, then the degree of likelihood can be factored in among all the
variables entering into the calculus of harm, thus giving it a pragmatic
use.83 In this context "foreseeable" is modified explicitly or implicitly
by "reasonably."
However, if "reasonably foreseeable" is used in the proximate cause
or extent of liability context, the reference is not necessarily to the
reasonable person calculus as presumably it was in Palsgraf. For

Lifter, Inc. v. Varnado, 480 So. 2d 1336, 1338-40 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (foreseeability that child
would be scalded because heater not heating water a jury issue, with insightful explorations of
App. Ct. 1985)
"foreseeability" variations); Duncan v. Rzonca, 478 N.E.2d 603, 615-16 (11.
(foreseeability of policeman's injury while responding to fire alarm set by unsupervised threeyear-old a jury issue); Ventricelli v. Kinney Sys. Rent A Car, Inc., 383 N.E.2d 1149, 1149-50
(N.Y. 1978) (negligent driver injuring another driver who was closing defective auto trunk lid
held not foreseeable); McMorrow v. Trimper, 540 N.Y.S.2d 106, 106-07 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)
(foreseeability of plaintiff jumping over guardrail, not into another lane but off a bridge, a jury
issue).
80. Wittgenstein shifted attention from reified "meanings" of words to internally and
externally observable uses of words, situationally, behaviorally, in "language games," as he put
it. See, e.g., WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 4, at 10-16. See generally J.L. AUSTIN, How TO Do
THINGS WITH WORDS (1962).
81. One, perhaps the usual, lay meaning of "foresee" is to "know beforehand." WEBSTER'S
NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICIIONARY 483 (1988). In that sense, "foreseeable" would mean
susceptible of being known beforehand.
82. See Ryan, 35 N.Y. at 212.
83. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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instance, it could be used to ask whether the results in question were
sufficiently likely to legitimate liability in the sense of fairness."4 In that
use it is akin to "proximate cause" in its ad hoc application."5
More subtle is the use of "foreseeable" in a mode that is not purely
factual or predictive. To say that something is or was foreseeable can
trigger an interpretation that it is being used in the purely predictive
mode because the verb "to be" is so often used as if information is
being provided, although often opinion or value judgments are involved.
Comparison with a lay use of "foreseeable" may be instructive. If a
passenger in an automobile were to say to the driver, "If you keep
driving like this, it's foreseeable we'll have a wreck," or just, "You're
risking our lives," it is not likely he is only conveying information. It
is a warning and a call for different behavior. Likewise, after the wreck,
for someone to say, "Well, it sure was foreseeable," is to imply that it
could have been prevented and likely that it should have been.86
In my experience, the devotion Leon Green's students showed for
"foreseeable" is explained by its use as a fact-value blend. Judges have
clearly used it in that way. Not that they should be excused, however,
from articulating the relevant values to the extent they can, as Holmes,
Green and from time to time Prosser thought judges should in all cases.
For that matter, there is no good reason why students, who will someday
be lawyers or even judges, should remain insensitive to the values they
project into their interpretations, analyses and arguments. After all, why
else engage in this sort of anti-conceptual exploration but to promote
that kind of realism?
V.

CONCLUSION

There are many other tort concepts and doctrinal characterizations
which serve as invitations to a misplaced focus. Actually, every tort
doctrinal topic has its focal categorizers which can serve as sort of black
holes into which critical and constructive thinking disappear. Some
degree of words consciousness of the kind I have suggested can serve

84. See Fleming, supra note 55, at 511.
85. Florida's Standard Jury Instructions on "legal cause" recommend instructing the jury

in terms of "reasonabl[e] foreseeab[ility]."

FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS

§ 5.1(c)

(1997). The accompanying commentary seems to suggest that somehow the jury will understand
that phrase to mean "probable." Id. § 5.1 cmt.2.
86. For a related and more extended discussion of the use of words by lawyers in terms
of what I call "persuasive definitions," see generally Walter Probert, Law and Persuasion:The
Language-Behaviorof Lawyers, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 35 (1959). Later I wrote of "rhetorical

definitions" in

WALTER PROBERT, LAW, LANGUAGE AND
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to counter their gravitational pull. At the least, a healthy words
skepticism will help.
Just how prevalent is conceptualistic thinking? We have virtually no
record as to the Bar. My calculated assumption so far as tort litigation
is concerned is that experienced lawyers are likely to overcome the
problem from case to case as they become immersed in the dynamics
of each situation. Their role as advocate helps them to search for ways
out of verbal traps. Yet they do have to confront trial judges whose
quite different role can lure them into inhibiting abstract categories. We
know that appellate judges write conceptualistically, although we know
not how often they actually think that way. The urge, if not the need, to
simplify is strong. And of course, judges are generalists without the
luxury of immersion in each topic before them.
We are left to wonder about legal education. My experience is such
that I believe law schools' curricula fall short for their failure to teach
linguistic skills beyond those. promoted through legal writing courses
and requirements. To be sure, students should learn to write "like
lawyers," but there could be a sort of "parallel universe," as it were, of
nonlegal writing about law.
Short of that approach, perhaps words consciousness can be taught
in at least one course, in Torts, for instance. It would, however, be far
from easy. For one thing, if casebooks are a guide, the kind of words
consciousness I have suggested is little promoted." A sequel to this
essay is required as proof or demonstration. A Leon Green sort of
radical skepticism can be used, but that tends to deny the established,
nonproblematic tort law. The short of it is that experiment in materials
and pedagogy is in order.
By the way, I do appreciate that "conceptualism" represents a
concept and that its use risks conceptualism.

87. See generally Walter Probert, The Politics of Torts Casebooks: Jurisprudence
Reductus, 69 TEx. L. REv. 1233 (1991) (analyzing six casebooks for ideological slanting, as
inevitable as conceptualism seems to be).
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